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PREFACE
Communism - Cultural Nihilism 
or a Political Mistake?
The idea of communism was bom in the West. The doctrines 
which expressed it came for the most part from France and Ger­
many, although some regarded Sir Thomas More as the author of 
its first modem justification. What is more, the two tendencies, the 
rationalism of the Enlightenment and historicism - employed by 
Marxism, the most popular and successful of these doctrines - 
enjoyed a much stronger following in Western than in Eastern 
intellectual circles. Yet communism as a political system, identi­
fied with bolshevism and sovietism, came into being not in the 
West, but in the East. It came into existence not where the idea 
and its justifying doctrines had been bom, but in a country whose 
social structure was inadequate for the Marxist project, a country 
whose traditions emphasized the significance not of the individ­
ual, but of centralized power, the importance not of the citizen, but 
of the state’s subject. Implanted in such an environment, Western 
communism absorbed these new ideas. It gradually lost its 
“humanistic impulse”, including the promise of the fulfillment of 
the eternal dream of every member of the human race, the full 
achievement of his humanity. To a large extent, then, it lost sight 
of the noble goal it had set for itself. This goal had been put for­
ward in a society dominated by peasantry who remembered the 
Tsarist autocracy, largely collectivist. It had enjoyed almost no 
liberal traditions that emphasized the importance of individual 
ownership as the precondition of diversity, privacy, and hierarchy. 
Such a community needed not a noble goal, but an elementary 
order. It was not persuasion but coercion issuing from the new 
center of the collective that was to provide standards of behavior 
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for individuals, whose highest aspiration was to survive, and not 
to achieve the perfection of the being specific to them.
Predictions regarding a possible union between Western-bom 
communist ideas and Eastern despotism were formulated by Pol­
ish thinkers as early as the mid-nineteenth century, both émigrés 
and those living under one of the three occupying powers. De­
prived of their own state, Poles were already taking note of the 
great threat to their cultural identity, and even to the physical sur­
vival of the nation which could follow from such a union. The 
great romantic poet, Zygmunt Krasiński, in the poem Dzień 
dzisiejszy (“The Present Day”, 1847) found “despotic commu­
nism” to be the greatest tyranny in the history of mankind, level­
ing individuals absolutely and putting them at the complete dis­
posal of rulers who were leading them in a direction known only 
to themselves. The essence of the two elements representing the 
threat, that is, Western communism and Eastern despotism, was 
held to be the anti-cultural tendency of both. For communism 
required not only the abolition of property, but also the removal of 
all individual possession. It destroyed all honor and the spirit of 
community, from the smallest community, the family, to the larg­
est, the state. Yet it destroyed much more: it eliminated traditional 
intermediate bodies, established political and legal institutions, the 
bonds that tied individuals and social groups together. It even 
perverted the meaning of words and of the hitherto dominant so­
cial relations established in the Christian culture of the European 
continent.
Eastern despotism led in an analogous direction. Like the radi­
cals in the West, it turned against all that was stable and capable 
of resisting Russian imperial ambitions, especially Churches and 
the centuries-old hierarchy within organic nations. It denied both 
the particular, which is the source of the diversity of subject 
communities, and the universal. The intellectual and moral critical 
tendency shook hands with the political tendency of the East. The 
cause of the destruction of the traditional vision of man, obedient 
to God and building his identity in many natural and traditional 
communities, met with the cause of building a “new order” by the 
autocrat. Both of these causes, combined theoretically for the first 
time in the doctrine of Marx and Engels, were seen by Polish 
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critics as leading not only to starvation and misery, but directly to 
a state where humans would be closer to animals than to rational 
beings, animals trained by those who in the name of the noble end 
defined in the West would employ methods characteristic to East­
ern despotism. This combination was seen as engendering rulers 
and owners combined into one, the sole possessors of minds and 
bodies. Yet this caused human hearts to decay, as they did not 
respect any principles established in the legacy of European cul­
ture. They leveled “all minds and bodies”, they set up models of 
behavior grounded in the base passions, and they thought in terms 
of “who gets the better of whom”, thereby destroying all mutual 
respect and trust among the members of the community. Polish 
critics perceived “slime” where the communists saw the fulfill­
ment of human dreams. They saw “dirt” where the authors of 
communism perceived “angelic purity”.
For them Communism was not a “political mistake”; it was, 
above all, an “anthropological” or “cultural” mistake, a “debase­
ment” rather than an “elevation” of man. Communism led not 
only to the denial of basic individual rights and to the exclusion of 
individuals from their part in the political and legislative process. 
By removing the foundations of the cultural heritage of Europe, 
communism created a void: it reduced man to his physical dimen­
sion. In promising the fulfillment of humanity through the satis­
faction of material needs, it accounted for only one human dimen­
sion, the material one; it dismissed the spiritual dimension, much 
more important according to the critics of communism and em­
phasized by the Christian culture that was attacked by communist 
adherents. Losing sight of this dimension, communism ignored 
the fundamental imperfection of the human body, which deter­
mines the intellectual and moral imperfection of man; it did not 
see that overcoming this imperfection is only possible through 
emancipation from physicality. The promises of communism were 
not as far-reaching and demanding as the standards of traditional 
culture, which emphasized the necessity of aiming at emancipa­
tion, but always through the overcoming of physicality. The con­
tent of these promises was simple: the satisfaction of man’s basic 
needs, even at the cost of property and law, even through the in­
stitution of the most horrible despotism conceivable. It abolished 
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individual freedom and replaced it with the incapacitation of 
subjects, who do not own property, do not constitute traditional 
and natural communities but who can enjoy equality in poverty, 
who lack the spiritual side but accept coarse sensuality, who deny 
the personal character of God and the personal character of man 
based on it but are resigned to existing in a coercive organism 
which can provide arbitrary, but generally applicable standards of 
behavior within their community1.
1 P. Popiel, Choroba wieku, [in:] Pisma, Cracow 1893, vol. I, pp. 247 
and 240.
The writings of Krasiński and Szymański, Małecki and 
Gołuchowski, active in the mid-nineteenth century, point to the 
danger posed by the communist idea, growing ever more in 
popularity among the dominant culture, not only among private 
owners, but also in families and political communities, in power 
structures and the dominant educational systems. Fears stemming 
from the prediction that the communist idea was going to be real­
ized were accompanied by apocalyptic visions of an “acultural 
chaos” where rulers enflamed with hatred would commit mass 
murder to further goals regarded by them as noble. They would 
employ inhuman means to carry out their plans; they would shape 
the citizens, fully subservient to them, into rivals obedient to their 
commands. This chaos calls into question the dominant standards 
of equity and justice, humanity and the community’s respect for 
individuality. It would be contained only by the decisions of those 
who based authority on the sheer fact of possessing greater power. 
These shaped the political world but ignored the fact that this 
world forms part of a larger order. The political world does not 
determine the content of culture and does not possess its own 
justification. Instead, it derives the meaning of power and the 
virtues of its holders from their traditional meanings, and it erects 
a stable legal system on the vision of a man who is imperfect be­
cause he is composed of soul and body. The critics of communism 
regarded the containment of this chaos by the rulers/owners as an 
attempt to square the circle in the political world, as an insanity 
that assaulted human individuality and nationhood, as the setting 
up of a loathsome bondage, as the destruction of human freedom, 
work, modesty, and love, and finally, as the abolition of all that
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was noble in man in order to maintain an unnatural equality. This 
“acultural chaos” could not be contained solely by means of legal 
norms. Authors said that it should be prevented, and if it did come 
about, an attempt should be made at slowly, but consistently re­
building what was destroyed and what had constituted the cultural 
heritage of the past. Communist visions wanted to abandon the 
cultural heritage of this segment of time, as they recognized only 
the present and the future. They announced the creation of a “new 
man”, emancipated from this heritage which encumbered him. 
The communist attempt to pare down this heritage was doomed to 
fail from the very start since it was directed against the two foun­
dations of society: human freedom and property. As such, it did 
not aim at tempering human nature, but at remaking it. It wanted 
to teach rulers how to control their slaves and to inculcate the rest 
with contempt for work and with love for incessant battle and 
robbery, the energetic passions of barbarians2.
A. M. Szymański, O komunizmie, “Przegląd Poznański” 1848, vol. 
VIII, p. 848.
In the reflections of the nineteenth-century authors we find 
arguments raised later by their descendants, who were aware not 
only of the significance and direction of the changes taking place 
in Russia after the Bolshevik victory, but also of the consequences 
of these changes, revealing a contradiction between the declared 
ideal and the reality of the Soviet State. We can also perceive the 
beginnings of the debate regarding the place in the history of 
modem political thought of the communist idea and of the com­
munist doctrine found in the writings of Marx and Engels. Critics 
were divided on this issue, some emphasizing the unique character 
of communism among modem doctrines, others regarding it only 
as an extreme version of other modem tendencies. Both groups 
were of the opinion that bolshevism, Sovietism or communism - 
these terms were used interchangeably to denote the communist 
experiment carried out by the Eastern despotism - would lead to 
the ultimate rupture between Russia and Western culture. This 
was the fundamental reason for the violent opposition of Polish 
thinkers to the communist threat, which was no longer potential, 
as in the nineteenth century, but became a reality after the October 
Revolution of 1917, after Soviet Russia came into being in the
2
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same year, and, a year later, after it waged war against the Polish 
State, resurrected from a century-long bondage. The Russo-Polish 
war was fought from 1919 to 1921 and produced great interest in 
the Soviet experiment among all social scientists and humanists in 
Poland. However, it was preceded by attempted incursions of the 
Bolshevik army, ordered by Lenin, into Lithuanian and Belorus­
sian lands which Polish authorities regarded as belonging to Po­
land.
This war was fought not only in defense of the Polish State; it 
was also fought in defense of Europe; it was an answer to the 
Bolshevik aim of spreading the proletarian revolution onto the 
entire continent. This extremely bloody war in defense of Poland 
and Europe, concluded with the 1921 Treaty of Riga, brought 
attention to the Soviet experiment. Eminent jurists and econo­
mists, philosophers and theologians, ethicists and psychologists 
reflected on the theoretical foundations of communism realized in 
Soviet Russia, and, from 1922, in the Soviet Union, created from 
the union of Russia with Belorussia, the Ukraine, and a number of 
other, smaller territories. In their now more frequent and deeper 
analyses they were preoccupied not with the predicted outcomes 
of the fulfillment of the communist vision, but with the manifold 
results of its realization. They no longer associated communism 
with a vision of a Kingdom of Perfection on Earth, with the idea, 
or with the doctrine justifying it. They associated it with the all- 
embracing system which put the order cherished by the first 
communists on its head. For they noticed that the political dimen­
sion, in its despotic Eastern version, overshadowed the economic, 
social, and cultural dimension. The problem of means gained 
predominance over the question of ends, and hence the “humanist 
impulse” lost all significance in favor of the “bare fact” of cap­
turing and consolidating power by the Bolsheviks. Revolutionary 
power and efficiency, forced obedience to those who justified 
their usurpation with arguments based on a vision of the commu­
nist future, provided legitimization for creating and enforcing the 
law. Yet although this legitimization was based on a bare fact, it 
gained substance thanks to a perspective contained in the Marxist 
ideology, a perspective combining Enlightenment rationalism with 
Hegelian historical determinism, directed towards the future and 
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associated with a vision of fulfilling “social justice”, adapted by 
Lenin to Russian requirements. However, the logic of ideology 
was relendess: the dictatorship of the masses longing for change 
had to be exercised by groups capable of defining the goal, deter­
mining the means of its achievement, and imposing them on all 
those who took part in the experiment. The power exercised on 
behalf of the “collective dictator” by the leaders of the Bolshevik 
party became their exclusive possession. The political world was 
vanishing as the monopolistic party administered the public 
sphere, extending the nomenclature-based bureaucracy and re­
placing public opinion with commentators appointed by itself3.
3 R. Rybarski, Siła i prawo, Warsaw 1936, p. 109.
4 W. L. Jaworski, Projekt konstytucji, Cracow 1928, p. 185.
5 R. Rybarski, op. cit., p. 110.
In such a state, or in the Bolshevik collectivity, as others pre­
ferred to call the Soviet entity4, politics became a specialization 
accessible only to a handful of people, who justified the exclusion 
of others with the claim that everything had to be managed from 
above if the projected goal was to be achieved. In the Bolshevik 
State, where one had to profess and believe in whatever was an­
nounced as the creed, where it was easy to slide into heresy or 
commit political blasphemy, the “command from above” became 
the only common denominator for subjects leveled in their mis­
ery5. This command, however, was only provisional; the law, 
composed of such provisional commands, was not a collection of 
norms such as we know it in the West. It did not serve the aim of 
imposing a permanent order on public life, but of creating a new 
reality. It did not bind the organs of power and did not put a con­
straint on coercion; being an instrument in the hands of the 
“collective dictator”, it could be altered at any time, if the repre­
sentative of the dictator decided that other norms would better 
serve the achievement of the predefined goal. The justification of 
the law was no longer the fact that a greater number supported it, 
as was the case - according to Polish inter-war thinkers - in 
Western democracies, but the possession of greater physical force. 
Indeed, the law became only a system of social norms, created 
and sustained by a specific social force, the same one which in­
spired and established the norm, adapting it to its own purposes. 
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This force formally belonged to the proletariat and served this 
class, but in fact in remained in and served the group that spoke on 
behalf of this class. Therefore, it was impossible to define criteria 
for evaluating the law and to provide reasons for opposing it6. It 
was equally impossible to find criteria for assessing the economic 
mechanisms employed by the Bolsheviks, since the dictatorship of 
the proletariat became the medium of thinking and acting for the 
Bolshevik elites, who identified themselves with the state and 
administered all spheres of human life. It eradicated all principles 
unwanted by the owners/rulers. The planned economy, managed 
centrally by a hugely overblown bureaucracy, was the economic 
equivalent of arbitrary regulation by the rulers of the public and 
private behavior of the subjects. It corresponded to the homoge­
nizing attempts by Stalin directed against all “nationalisms” 
within the Soviet Union. The homogeneity of norms made man­
agement easier. These included the uniformization of thought and 
action among people reduced to the level of animals, the collec­
tivization of agriculture and wide-scale industrialization, gulags 
and terror, deportations and political trials, and finally repeated 
“purges”. All of these measures substantiated the fears formulated 
a century earlier by authors who predicted what the consequences 
of welding Western communism with Eastern despotism would 
be. These consequences proved to be even more severe than those 
brought about by other totalitarianisms: those of the Nazis and the 
Fascists.
6 I. Czuma, Dzisiejsza filozofia prawa a romantyzm prawniczy. Lublin 
1930, p. 32; K. Grzybowski, Ustrój Związku Socjalistycznych Sowiec­
kich Republik. Doktryna i konstytucja, Cracow 1929, p. 22; W. Su- 
kiennicki, Marksowsko-leninowska teoria prawa, Vilnius 1934, p. 8.
Put together, all these things created a picture of “Soviet hell”, 
analyzed from various point of view by inter-war Polish authors, a 
picture removed from the one painted by the American diplomat 
Davies, living in Moscow from 1936 to 1938. He regarded the 
Soviet Union as a kind of Sunday school for children where eve­
ryone is happy, gentle, polite, and good old uncle Joe (Stalin), 
sentimental as God the Father, even when murdering his political 
opponents, is doing something practically as innocent as picking 
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spring flowers1. In fact, as early as the Autumn of 1939, in the 
initial stages of World War n, the red reality of the Soviet hell 
appeared in Poland, divided between nazi Germany and the 
“communist collectivity”. The picture which had been so well 
recognized east of Poland was now replicated in our country, and 
lasted, albeit with varying degrees of intensity, for 45 years. In the 
“red hell” it is not only a question of crimes committed against 
innocent people under the authority of “communist law”. For not 
only was the body under threat there, but perhaps primarily the 
soul. The injection of ideological content into many areas of the 
public sphere, especially education and the mass media, was much 
more harmful than the ideological attitude to politics and law. The 
former created havoc in minds, blurred the meanings of basic 
concepts, and made people forget the importance of individual 
independence and privacy. The latter only constituted the basis of 
the blind coercion justified by the projected goal, although even 
the communists themselves finally admitted that this goal was 
unachievable. The USSR, the country where a failed attempt at 
realizing the communist idea had been made on the basis of the 
rationalist and historicist formulas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, 
was formally dissolved on December 16, 1991, but the conse­
quences of this attempt are still felt. Moreover, they are not only 
of an economic character, for in this sphere the countries formerly 
ruled by communists are gaining lost ground, even if power is 
held by members of the former nomenclature. They are not only 
of a political character: in this sphere the changes seem to have 
been even more rapid than in the economic one. The fundamental 
“problem with communism” is of an intellectual nature and in­
volves a decline of the sense that certain basic concepts describing 
the public sphere of human life are self-evident. It also involves 
the undermining of the “moral sense” and the abolition of the 
foundations on which trust and respect, indispensable attributes of 
political co-existence, once rested.
Communism, which had promised to fulfil all human dreams, 
gave rise to a totalitarian system which deprived all individuals of 
autonomy and independence, not only by gagging them and forc-
7 I. Matuszewski, Wybór pism. New York-London 1952, p. 184. 
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ing them to remain silent, but also by imposing a specific outlook 
and antagonizing individuals. It gave rise to a system which ful­
filled the predictions of mid-nineteenth-century critics: availing 
itself of noble justifications, it created human beings distrustful of 
each other. It built an apparatus of power which put all spheres of 
life under tight control, which employed secret police and an 
elaborate network of informers. This apparatus inspired hostile 
relations in the workplace and in the family and destroyed the 
family, just as it destroyed other traditional intermediate struc­
tures: Churches and universities, local and professional communi­
ties.
The idea called communism, when put into practice, turned out 
to be not so much a fulfillment of human dreams, but a justifica­
tion of a system which reduced man to an almost bestial state. 
Instead of being associated with an act of emancipation, it gave 
rise to a system which according to many Polish critics was more 
degrading that fascism or nazism. This system not only killed, but 
also crushed man, robbed him of his identity, of the awareness of 
basic concepts, dignity, and knowledge. It not only killed many 
but also debilitated those who survived. It not only robbed, but 
also made human growth impossible. Despite the promises of its 
adherents, it did not “elevate man”, but “lowered” him to a level 
where he had never been before, excluding perhaps times of slav­
ery. Instead of a collective pursuit of a far-reaching goal, it created 
a great camp in which individuals struggling against one another 
were enclosed. It created a Bolshevik collectivity instead of a state 
- a collection of rules arbitrarily adopted by those who had de­
fined the noble purpose and nominated themselves for selecting 
the means of realizing that purpose, instead of law as a nexus of 
fixed norms of behavior, binding for everyone, even the organs of 
coercion. These are just a few of the contradictions between the 
promise and its fulfillment. The abolition of these contradictions 
became the cause of many Polish critics of communism, not only 
of those who regarded communism as “absolute evil” and refused 
to have anything to do with its advocates, but also of those who 
wanted the rulers to drop ideology in favor of simple “economic 
and political interests”. Along with those who adopted the popular 
language of “democracy” and “human rights”, the latter ceased to 
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perceive communism as an “anthropological mistake” and started 
seeing it as a “political mistake”. This qualification, perhaps justi­
fied in the face of changes in contemporary postmodernist culture, 
dominated by relativism, nominalism, utilitarianism, and rational­
ism, emphasizing the instrumental character of human intellect 
with regard to his “practical needs”, contributed in large measure 
to the “softening” of communism in Poland. It also convinced 
many that by shaking off the chains of ideology, by forgetting 
about the noble purpose and means, the former champions of this 
ideology will turn into trustworthy participants of the political 
game. The question of whether ideology - whose purpose was, as 
many critics contend, to bring about a gradual degradation of the 
spirit - did cause an irreversible damage in its adherents remains 
open. Also unanswered is the question of whether it is enough to 
conclude that in some countries communism assumed a “human 
face” and that by merely implementing democratic mechanisms 
and respecting human rights it turned into something progres­
sively more similar to the liberal democracies of the West. These 
questions belong for the most part to the political sphere, where 
there is no place for unequivocal answers. Perhaps limiting the 
poignant lesson of communism to the political dimension was 
justified when changing the institutional order or gaining access to 
power by various opposition circles was at stake. Yet it is not right 
to sum up the communist experience with a simple statement of its 
“political impropriety”. It was much more dangerous than it seems 
to those who look at it from afar. It was much more dangerous 
from the point of view of those who lost not only their property, 
but also intellectual certainty, especially about the public sphere, 
about ethical categories, about the stability of law, about politics 
as serving the common good, and about God as the foundation of 
the sense of human life. Therefore, those who remembered the 
words of August Hlond, the Primate of Poland, about Christ’s 
saving the people from barbarism and devastation* so keenly 
received the call of Pope John Paul II - who like them had experi­
enced communism direcdy - to rediscover God in the “no man’s 
land” and to understand that in communion with Him they will
A. Hlond, Przemówienie wygłoszone w Poznaniu w Środą Popielcową 
1932 r., Poznań 1932, p. 6.
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recover their humanity despite the darkness of the “communist 
hell” enveloping them. History testifies that the recovery of hu­
manity preceded the 1980 explosion of “Solidarity”, a mass 
movement of resistance against the ideologically minded commu­
nist elites.
What we, together with John Paul H, have considered as an 
“anthropological mistake”, appeared less and less in the writings 
of Polish critics of communism, who preferred to reflect on hu­
man rights, methods of economic management, or democratic 
mechanisms. These subjects gained priority in the discourse 
dominant in the second half of the twentieth century. It seems, 
however, and let the materials presented here serve as a proof that 
it was the anthropological mistake which largely determined the 
symptoms of the disease and which also appeared in the political 
dimension. The anthropological mistake constitutes the founda­
tions of the malaise that deprives man of his bond with the super­
natural and with what is characteristic of deeply rooted communi­
ties. The “political mistake” followed from the adoption of a false 
notion of human nature. In this conception man is considered as 
reduced to his material dimension, determined in his actions, and 
subject to the power of those who lead him within the temporal 
framework towards the fulfillment of a political goal. The critics 
who adopted an ethical, rather than a political perspective, re­
garded this conception as a graver problem than “ideologization” 
of political life.
The present selection leaves many questions unanswered, but it 
allows us to grasp the principal positions in the debate that took 
place in Polish thought during at least 150 years. At first this de­
bate was dominated by predictions that communism would de­
stroy the cultural foundations of Christian Europe. Later it was 
later supplemented with detailed analyses that showed the conse­
quences of the implementation of the communist idea formulated 
in the West by methods characteristic of Eastern despotism. Al­
though filled with statistical data, these analyses did not lose sight 
of the main preoccupation, that the common European code of 
meaning and many traditional legal and political institutions might 
not survive. Finally, motivated by the need to regain access to 
public life, critics started to present communism as a kind of 
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“political mistake”, although some of them, especially the more 
conservatively inclined, perceived much deeper strata of the 
“communist hell”. The editors intend this anthology as an intro­
duction to an informed reflection on the content of the communist 
idea, doctrine, and system, and on what was associated with the 
communist dream in various periods of Polish philosophical, le­
gal, political, and economic thought. It should provoke the ques­
tion of whether the concepts and phenomena, hopes and calami­
ties connected with communism did enrich our awareness of the 
dangers that might appear in the cultural and political world. Per­
haps they will be dismissed as nothing more than a demonstration 
that a two-centuries-long economic and political experiment 
aimed at perfecting man has failed. However, the aim of this work 
is above all to indicate that communism and its manifestations 
provoked the criticism of some of the most eminent representa­
tives of Polish social and humanist thought, concerned about the 
possibility and then the reality of the communist outlook’s being 
put into practice.
The precise sequence of the texts was determined largely by the 
time when they were written, which is of particular importance 
when we are dealing with attempts at describing and analyzing 
changes which occurred in the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of Poland. We hope that this anthology will allow the 
English-speaking reader to become acquainted with this attitude. 
Moreover, we wish to dedicate this book to all those who were 
victims of those who believed in the possibility of realizing the 
communist vision or who worked for regimes which used the 
communist ideology as a justification for their actions. We wish to 
dedicate it to the memory of those who died at their hands or at 
their command and offer it to those who lost the fruit of their life­
time’s work or who were deprived of much of their own heritage.

